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SEX DISCRIMINATION IN LAW SCHOOL
PLACEMENT
FRANK T. READ-
ELISABETH S. PETERSENJ
Discussions are habitually necessary in courts of justice,
which are unfit for female ears. The habitual presence of
women at these would tend to relax the public sense of
decency and propriety. If, as counsel threatened, these things
are to come, we will take no voluntary part in bringing
them about-In re Motion to Admit Miss Lavinia Goodel to
the Bar.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1970, the University of Michigan Law School barred a New
York City law firm from using its placement facilities the following
academic year. This unanimous law faculty action was taken after
an investigation of statements made on campus by a recruiter for
the firm which indicated that the firm had a de facto hiring policy
discriminatory to women.2 In July 1971, 13 women law students
filed complaints against ten New York City law firms with the New
York City Commission on Human Rights, alleging discrimination
against women in hiring and recruiting.3 In the 1970 survey of law
schools conducted by the Association of American Law Schools
(AALS) Special Committee on Women in Legal Education, over
26 law schools reported at least one incident of alleged discrimina-
tion against female students.4 These suits and complaints come at
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1. 39 Wis. 232, 246 (1875).
2. See Washington Post, Mar. 27, 1970, at A2.
3. N.Y. Times, July 1, 1971, at 59, col. 7.
4. This statistic is taken from the preliminary statistical compilation (no formal
report has been issued) of the responses to a questionnaire sent out by the AALS
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a time when there are a far greater number of women enrolled as
law students than ever before. These actions indicate both a grow-
ig awareness by women students of their civil rights and an ap-
parent inability of many law firms to recognize that women stu-
dents can be capable associates and future partners. The inter-
action of these two forces has caught most law school placement
offices unprepared, causing confusion as to their legal responsibili-
ties and rights.5 The purpose of this Article is to examine briefly
the law applicable to law school placement offices, to delineate the
legal duties imposed on such offices, to discuss enforcement prob-
lems in administering nondiscrimination policies, and to suggest
possible procedural approaches that might satisfy a law school's
legal and moral obligations.
Special Committee. The questions covered all aspects of law school life, with
emphasis on admissions procedures and placement problems. The questionnaire was
answered by 76 schools; data from seven schools arrived after the compilation; eight
schools returned the questionnaire either unanswered or too incomplete to be in-
cluded; 35 schools (including Yale and Harvard) did not respond to the question-
naire. Of the responding schools, those reporting discriminatory incidents included:
Boston University, University of California at Berkeley, University of California at
Hastings, University of California at Los Angeles, Catholic University of America,
University of Colorado, Cornell University, Cumberland School of Law of Samford
University, Duke University, Duquesne University, University of Kansas, University
of Louisville, Loyola University (New Orleans), University of Maine, University of
Maryland, University of Michigan, University of Minnesota, University of North
Carolina, New York University, Ohio State University, University of Oregon, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania, University of Pittsburgh, Stanford University, University of
Texas, Texas Tech. University, and the University of Wisconsin. The Special Com-
mittee's statistical report reinforces data contained in a 1965 survey. See White,
Women in the Law, 65 MIcH. L. Rv. 1085 (1967), where the following responses
were received from law school directors: six reported discrimination against females
was insignificant; 43 reported discrimination was significant and 14 reported dis-
crimination was extensive. The last two categories included representatives at six of
nine institutions classified by the survey as prestige institutions. See also Barnes,
Women and Entrance to the Legal Profession, 23 J. LEGAL ED. 276, 293-97 (1971).
5. The law schools responding to the AALS Special Committee's questionnaire in-
dicated a variety of dispositions to complaints received: denial of further use of place-
ment facilities; no action; personal contact with the firm; investigation; "pep talks"
to hiring partners before women were sent to interview the firm; and conferences
with recruiters, firms and students. Few schools reported that formal procedures for
handling complaints existed at the time the complaints were received. Some schools
added that procedures were subsequently adopted.
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II. THE APPLICABLE LAW
A. Does Title VI Apply?
The federal concern for equal employment opportunities for
women has been given expression in several statutory and adminis-
trative measures.6 The statute most important in curtailing employ-
ment discrimination against women is Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.7 The prohibition against sex discrimination in Title
VII is part of a general effort to confront racial, religious, ethnic
and sex discrimination. By creating the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC),s Title VII established a procedure for
administrative review of complaints of discrimination.9 Title VII's
rather restrictive jurisdictional requirements0 and its enforce-
6. The Equal Pay Act deals solely with the question of compensation and pro-
vides that women performing particular tasks must be compensated at the same rate
as men undertaking the same assignments. See Fair Labor Standards Act § 6(d), 29
U.S.C. § 206(d) (1964). The President, through a series of Executive Orders, has
extended the equal employment obligation both to the federal government in its
employer capacity and to persons and firms performing federally sponsored contracts.
See Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1965), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. V, 1970).
as amended Exec. Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. 320 (1967), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp.
V, 1970); Exec. Order No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. 133 (1969), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. V,
1970). Contractors affected by the order are required to effectuate affirmative action
programs to evidence their compliance with the prohibition or risk application of
the sanction for noncompliance: termination of the federally assisted contract.
7. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. V, 1970).
8. Id. § 2000e-4.
9. An aggrieved person or EEOC member may file a written charge with EEOC
seeking review of any employment practice which falls within the statutory ban.
EEOC does not have direct enforcement power but is authorized to secure volun-
tary compliance from the offending employer. If such compliance is not forthcoming,
the complaining or aggrieved party may initiate a private suit based on the statutory
prohibition. Because litigants under Title VII must bear the burden, and at least
the initial cost of litigation, and because thcy act as private attorneys general vin-
dicating national policy, the Act allows for a prevailing party to recover reasonable
attorneys' fees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (k) (Supp. V, 1970); see, e.g., Clark v. American
Marine Corp., 320 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. La. 1970); Irvin v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 308
F. Supp. 152 (ED. Ark. 1970).
10. The Civil Rights Act states that a charge must be filed within 90 days after
the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, unless the alleged discrimina-
tion occurred in a state which has a fair employment practice law, in which case
the complainant must wait 60 days after commencing proceedings under the state
or local law, but must file before the elapse of 210 days or within 30 days of receiving
notice of the termination of local procedures, whichever is earlier. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5 (d) (Supp. V, 1970).
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ment mechanism have been subject to considerable criticism." Sev-
eral recent legislative proposals have sought to equip EEOC with
more powerful enforcement options, including the right to issue
judicially enforceable cease and desist orders.12 Additional en-
forcement of the anti-discrimination provisions of Title VII is
achieved through actions initiated by the Attorney General when
he finds evidence of a "pattern or practice of resistance to the
full enjoyment of ... the rights" established under the Title 3
The full implications of Title VII in confronting sex discrimina-
tion in the placement process are not known. Questions can even
be raised as to the applicability of Title VII to law school place-
ment offices. The argument that the law school placement office
is within Title VII's coverage is based on the assumption that such
an office would qualify as an employment agency within the Act's
definition. Title VII defines an employment agency as follows:
The term "employment agency" means any person regularly
undertaking with or without compensation to procure em-
ployees for an employer or to procure for employees oppor-
tunities to work for an employer and includes an agent of
such a person; but shall not include an agency of the United
States, or an agency of a State or political subdivision of a
State, except that such term shall include the United States
Employment Service and the system of State and local em-
ployment services receiving Federal assistance. 14
Despite the popular association of the term "employment agency"
with proprietary establishments undertaking a job referral function
for compensation, the statute is clear that its coverage does not de-
pend upon the commercial nature of the enterprise. Rather the
feature which determines coverage by Title VII is the employment
agency's efforts either to locate employment opportunities for ap-
plicants or to fill employer originated requisitions of new employees.
The law school placement office engages in such activities and is
therefore apparently within the definition of Title VII. For this
reason, EEOC has taken the position that private college placement
11. See, e.g., Developments in The Law-Employment Discrimination and Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. RyV. 1109, 1200-16 (1971).
12. See H.R. RaP. No. 1746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1971).
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (a) (Supp. V, 1970).
14. Id. § 2000e (c).
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offices (and ipso facto private law school placement offices) must
conform to the restrictions imposed by the Act.:'
Despite the presently assumed certainty of coverage, the legisla-
tive history of Title VII is not unequivocal. Several aspects of that
history deserve consideration. When Congress indicated a willing-
ness in 1963 and 1964 to consider the need for legislative control
of racially discriminatory practices, its membership responded with
a variety of specific legislative proposals which numbered in the
hundreds.1 6 The thrust of most of these measures was to confront
questions of employer discrimination. As a result, the primary at-
tention in hearings and debate was limited to the need for federal
control of employer practices. Many of the measures considered,
however, also included provisions relating to employment agencies
and the job-referral process, although in general these portions of
the legislative offerings were not as controversial as were those
affecting prohibition of employer discrimination. The specific lan-
guage of some of these bills was directly responsive to the question
of the extension of the discrimination prohibition to placement
offices. For example, Senate bill 1210, introduced by Senator Case,
included language similar to that found in Title VII, as later en-
acted; bill 1210 stated that an "'employment agency' means any per-
son undertaking with or without compensation to procure em-
ployees or opportunities to work for an employer."'17 This definition
in bill 1210, however, included a specific exception for certain non-
profit organizations, including "any religious, charitable, fraternal,
social, educational or sectarian corporation or association."'" After
the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare held hearings
on bill 1210 and other fair employment bills it recommended pas-
sage of bill 193719 which did not specifically exempt educational
associations from coverage as employment agencies.20
15. Letter from David Cashdan, Esq., (EEOC), to Assistant Professor John C.
'weistart, Nov. 9, 1970, stating that "it is the position of EEOC that private college
placement offices do fit within the Title's definition of 'employment agencies."' EEOC
has also ruled that law firms with the requisite number of employees are covered
by Title VI. See White, supra note 4, at 1100 n.73.
16. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. IND. & Com. L. Rnv. 431 (1966).
17. See S. REP. No. 1210, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1963).
18. Id. 26 (emphasis added).
19. Vaas, supra note 16, at 433 n.10.
20. See Hearings on S. 1937 Before the Subcomm. on Employment and Man-
power of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 76
(1963).
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The bill which eventually yielded the present version of Title
VII was House of Representatives bill 7152. Because of the contro-
versial nature of its subject matter, this bill was subject to extended
efforts at amendment. The original version of the bill directed its
prohibitions at racial, ethnic and religious discrimination; 2' an
amendment, added by Congressman Smith of Virginia, expanded its
coverage to include sex-based distinctions.22 During this lengthy
amending process, the attention of Congress was again focused on the
application of the measure to educational placement services; in
this regard, Senator Tower of Texas introduced amendment number
608 which sought to exempt "any student placement service of an
educational institution which is exempt from taxation under §
501 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code. '"2 3 At the time of this pre-
sentation, Senator Tower indicated that the bill in its original form
had not been intended to cover placement offices. 24 His proposal was
suggested to clarify the Title's coverage and make it conform to
what he perceived as the intent of the drafters of the original mea-
sure.
Senator Tower's move to exclude college placement offices was
premised on two primary arguments. The first was the realization
that regulatory schemes typically have the effect of increasing the
costs incurred by the regulated body. In the case of the proposed
regulation of discriminatory practices, these costs would include the
21. Hearings on Civil Rights Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Committee
on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 4, pt. 1, at 649-60 (1963).
22. 110 CONG. REC. 2577, 2718 (1964) (remarks of Mr. Smith & Mrs. Frances P.
Bolton).
23. 110 CONG. REc. 11,720 (daily ed. May 22, 1964).
24. Senator Tower said:
[T]his is a very simple amendment designed only to clarify a situation with
which I think there is complete agreement. It specifically exempts university
and college placement services from the civil rights bill definition of an "em-
ployment agency."
I do not believe that it ever was intended for placement services main-
tained by educational institutions for the assistance of their students to come
under the term "employment agencies." But the bill leaves the matter
uncertain ...
Assuming that "prospective employees" are intended to be covered by
this act, then students certainly might be included if they are served by
placement services in seeking initial work after their education. They almost
certainly would be covered in seeking new opportunities through such a ser-
vice in the later years of their employment. . . .
I feel that it is unrealistic to bring college placement services under this
law, neither do I think it was intended.
[Vol. 18
SEx DISCRIMINATION
record keeping which was likely to accompany the Act; the
payment of legal fees for assistance in interpretation of the Act;
and preparation of a defense should a charge of discrimination be
brought against the placement office. Senator Tower indicated his
appreciation of the financial difficulties which many schools were
experiencing and stated that Congress should not undertake to
increase that burden. In addition, he was concerned that the ex-
tension of the Act to such placement offices would impair the opera-
tion of schools which served predominantly minority populations.2 5
Although the Tower amendment was not adopted, the fact that
it was even proposed is troublesome, because it suggests that the
original version of the statute was not intended to include placement
offices. While other aspects of the legislative history lend some slight
support to this view, 26 the literal language of the statute leaves little
basis for doubt. The specific statement that the absence of compen-
sation does not affect coverage provides a direct refutation of the
idea that only commercial agencies were intended to be covered.
In addition to the clear language of Title VII, there is also a
strong policy basis for extending Title VII's coverage to placement
offices. Law school placement offices play a central role in providing
access to the legal profession. One of the purposes of Title VII is to
enhance the professional opportunities of previously oppressed socie-
tal classes. To effectuate such purposes, therefore, it is important
to insure that channels of access to legal positions be opened as
wide as possible. Control of discriminatory practices in law school
placement offices will promote that objective. While it is true that
improper hiring practices can be confronted directly on an individual
employer basis, it is clearly more efficient to use the placement office
as a control mechanism. Focusing attention on the placement office
25. Id. Senator Tower remarked on this point:
Mhis provision would operate to the detriment of those remaining colleges
which are primarily utilized for whatever reason by a majority of students of
a so-called minority group. This could affect especially church supported
schools.
Id. Senator Tower was concerned here with black schools and church schools.
He does not mention women's colleges among minority schools. In fact, any
implication that the Act in its original form would prohibit the operation of a place-
ment program restricted to women or men only as a result of limitations in the com-
position of the student body is probably unfounded. The Act permits referrals on
a nondiscriminatory basis and that standard seems to be met when the basis for dis-
crimination is not the sex of the applicant, but rather his status as a non-student.
26. 110 CONG. Rac. 16,001 (daily ed. July 6, 1964) (offering by Senator Dirksen
of the Comparative Analysis of Two Versions of the Civil Rights Bill (H.R. 7512)).
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as the enforcement vehicle is not trouble free, however, for the
definition of "employment agencies" excludes most state agencies.2 7
This omission excludes placement offices at state-funded educational
institutions from Title VII coverage. Although placement offices at
state supported law schools are excluded, the greater number of law
schools are privately financed and are, therefore, subject to Title
VII.28 Furthermore, the exclusion of state supported schools would
not mean that their placement offices function free of restraint. Most
state supported schools are members of the Association of American
Law Schools (AALS) and their continued membership, and there-
fore their accreditation, by the AALS may be conditioned on con-
formity with AALS nondiscrimination policies. 29
State supported law schools are also subject to other types of
prohibitions, including those which might arise under Executive
Order 11,246 (as amended by Executive Order 11,375, Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964) 0 or various state fair employment
practice laws. In addition, for certain types of discrimination direct
constitutional prohibitions are applicable.3' Unfortunately, the spe-
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (c) (Supp. V, 1970).
28. There are 64 private law schools accredited by both the AAIS and the
American Bar Association (ABA); there are 60 publicly supported law schools ac-
credited by both the AALS and the ABA. In addition there are 17 private schools
and 6 publicly supported schools that are ABA approved only. See Directory of Law
Teachers (1971).
29. See note 56, infra for full quotation of appropriate AALS policy and cita-
tion to appropriate source. Because the articles and approved policy of the AAIS
specifically state that "equality of opportunity in legal education includes equal op-
portunity to obtain employment," it can be argued that a school which does not afford
its female students equal employment opportunity is in violation of fundamental
AALS policy. Id.
30. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (Supp. 1965), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp.
V, 1970), as amended Exec. Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. 320 (Supp. 1967), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e (Supp. V, 1970).
31. See Reed v. Reed, 92 S. Ct. 251 (1971) (mandatory provision of Idaho probate
code giving preference to men over women violative of the equal protection clause);
Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., 326 F. Supp. 1159 (E.D. Va. 1971) (maternity
policy of school board requiring women teachers to take a leave of absence at begin-
ning of sixth month of pregnancy discriminatory and denies equal protection of the
laws); Kirstein v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va.
1970) (denial to women, on the basis of sex, educational opportunities at the
Charlottesville campus not offered at other institutions in the state, violative of the
equal protection clause); Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95
Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971) (classification created by statute barring women bartenders held
invidious, arbitrary and thus a denial of equal protection of the laws). But see
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cific impact of these other regulations upon discriminatory place-
ment activities is ambiguous. Consequently their prohibitions can-
not be translated into rules readily applicable to the placement
process. Moreover, the necessity of resorting to a diverse body of law
to control placement discrimination is confusing and could inhibit
anti-discrimination efforts.
B. What Are the Legal Duties of Placement Offices Under Title
V1?
Although state supported law school placement offices are not
covered by Title VII, private law school placement offices are clearly
within its scope. Therefore, an examination of the regulations for
implementing operation of Title VII is in order.3 2
1. Notice Posters
The initial duty imposed on the placement office comes from
section 711 (a) of the Act which requires that an
employment agency . . . shall post and keep posted in con-
spicuous places upon its premises where notices to . . .
applicants for employment ... are customarily posted a no-
tice to be prepared or approved by the Commission setting
forth excerpts from or, summaries of, the pertinent provisions
of this [title] and information pertinent to the filing of a
complaint. 33
The statute reinforces its requirement by adding that each sepa-
rate, willful violation of this section results in a fine.34 Pursuant to
the statutory directive, EEOC issued a notice for posting in the
placement office, to inform users of those placement facilities of
their right to file complaints.3 5 The posted notice is intended to tell
the applicant: (1) that he or she may have a basis of complaint
Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970) (denial of admission to men
by a "women's university," on the basis of sex, not a denial of equal protection).
32. Regulations promulgated by EEOC pursuant to its Title VII responsibility
do not carry the force of law and are in reality mere suggestions. See, e.g., American
Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. Alexander, 294 F. Supp. 1100 (D.D.C. 1968); Hicks
v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 49 F.R.D. 184, 191 (1968); International Chem. Workers
Union v. Planter's Mfg. Co., 259 F. Supp. 365 (N.D. Miss. 1966).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-10 (a) (Supp. V, 1970).
34. Id. § 20OOe-10 (b).
35. EEOC Procedural Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.27 (1970).
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against the employer; and (2) that he or she may also have a basis
for a complaint against the placement office itself.
2. Advertisements
Besides requiring that the placement office disseminate informa-
tion concerning its own and the employer's Title VII coverage, the
statute lists several unlawful employment practices. One such pro-
hibited practice is the printing or publishing by an agency of
any notice or advertisement relating to employment . .. or
. . .any classification or referral for employment by such an
employment agency, indicating any preference, limitation,
specification, or discrimination, based on . . .sex. . .[un-
less] such a notice or advertisement may indicate [a basis for]
a bonafide occupation qualification (BFOQ).36
This prohibition on the posting of discriminatory notices suggests
that there is an implied duty of placement offices to scrutinize em-
ployer-supplied promotional materials so that the office itself will
comply with the Act. Recently it has been suggested that this pro-
hibition includes law firm resumes among promotional materials.8 7
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (b) (Supp. V, 1970). Regulation 1604.4 reflects the statute's
proscription on sex-delineated job advertisements:
It is a violation of Title VII for a help wanted advertisement to indicate a
preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination based on sex unless sex
is a bona fide occupational qualification for the particular job involved. The
placement of an advertisement in columns classified by publishers on the basis
of sex, such as columns headed "Male" or "Female," -will be considered an ex-
pression of preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination based on sex.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.4 (1970).
37. See Longo, Self Defense for Women Lawyers, 4 J. OF LAW REFoaM 517, 529
(1971). Coverage of such materials by Title VII could put the placement offices of
most law schools out of compliance with the above discussed section. An example of
a suspect law firm resume is as follows:
Our firm has taken on an average of three new men a year for the past
several years. We generally limit our recruitment to men in the upper 25
percent of their class. We hire a man with the intention that he will remain
with us permanently and eventually join the partnership. Unlike some firms,
it is not our practice to hire a relatively large number of young men and
then have a "weeding out" after a few years. Our turnover has been relatively
small; all but two of the men we have hired out of law school since 1950
are still with us. We hire at least two men for summer work between their
second and third years of law school and naturally like to consider such men
prospects for permanent employment. We also usually hire one or two men
between their first and second year for summer work.
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3. Referrals
Referrals constitute another area covered by Title VII and
EEOC regulations. The statute makes it an unlawful employment
practice for an "employment agency to fail or refuse to refer for
employment ...any individual because of ... sex."38 Although
law school placement offices do not function exactly like commercial
placement agencies, the offices do make referrals similar to those
made by their commercial counterparts. One such referral occurs
when the placement office provides interviewing space for the
prospective employer. The resulting coverage by the Act of this
placement activity presents problems for placement officials. The
first problem occurs when the employment agency receives a job
order that contains an unlawful sex specification. EEOC regulations
state that the employment agency "[w]ill share responsibility with
the employer placing the job order if the agency fills the order
knowing that the sex specification is not based upon a [BFOQ]." 39
In addition, the guidelines recently issued by legal counsel for the
College Placement Council, Inc. (CPC Guidelines) and prepared in
conjunction with EEOC's Office of Technical Assistance, indicate
that placement offices should not make referrals under discriminatory
job orders.40 Rather, the CPC Guidelines suggest that the placement
office should investigate the basis for the job order by asking the
employer to substantiate his need for a BFOQ. In most situations in-
volving women attorneys, there is probably little basis for the valid
assertion of a BFOQ, and consequently, such job orders should not
This excerpt, taken from the resume of a large law firm, was received in the Duke
Law School Placement Office in the fall of 1971 (emphasis added). The employer's
brochure, prepared solely to inform the interested law student about the firm, its
policies, its location and nature of its practice, repeatedly refers to its future em-
ployees as "men." Read literally, the material implies that women law students will
not be considered for permanent or part-time clerking positions. Undoubtedly the
firm would argue that this interpretation is too narrow, and it is possible that it
meant to use the generic meaning of the word "men." Given the past employment
practices of law firms, however, the suspicion remains that such brochures dis-
courage women attorneys from applying to the issuing firm. In such instances the
authors suggest that the placement office, to protect itself from liability under Title
VII, should notify the firm of the impression created by its material and ask for a
clarification of the firm's position.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (b) (Supp. V, 1970).
39. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.5 (b) (1970). See also id. § 1604.4.
40. Letter from Herbert E. Marks, Esq., member of the firm serving as counsel
to the College Placement Council, Inc., to Assistant Professor John C. Weistart, July
20, 1971. This correspondence transmitted the guidelines.
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be filled by law school placement agencies. A similar situation arises
when the placement office "suspects" that the employer in fact
discriminates. The statute can be construed narrowly to require
no more than that a placement office refer people without regard
to sex, but policy considerations suggest that the placement office
should not make the referral if it anticipates discrimination against
the referred applicant. Since EEOC regulations have construed the
sex discrimination sections of Title VII broadly enough to cover
private placement offices, it is doubtful that the Commission would
accept a narrow reading of its position.4 1 Furthermore, regulation
1604.5 (b) states that only "[i]f the agency does not have reason to
believe that the employer's claim of [BFOQ] is without sub-
stance . *..."42 will the agency be absolved from liability. Therefore,
a placement office's suspicions may be sufficient to bring it under
the regulation.43
The CPC Guidelines not only advise council members on how
to react to allegations of discrimination which relate to job
referrals; they also suggest appropriate responses where the dis-
crimination is not directly related to on-campus actions. In the
latter cases the guidelines recommend: (1) a review of placement
office records of the charged employer which would bear on any
pattern of the employer's practices in hiring procedures, and (2) an
investigation of the charge by asking for the employer's response
to the allegation. If the charge is substantiated, the guidelines
recommend that the employer be barred from using placement
facilities until he furnishes suitable assurances that the discrimina-
tory practices have been abandoned. These guidelines, however,
are limited only to those employers who utilize the placement fa-
cilities. They do not cover any off-campus discrimination encoun-
tered by women students using individual efforts, such as letters
directed to firms. Placement policies and guidelines of both EEOC
41. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 (a) (1970) which reinforces this view, by stating "The
Commission believes that the [BFOQ] exception as to sex should be interpreted
narrowly." The test for the BFOQ articulated by EEOC is the need of this qualifica-
tion for "purposes of authenticity or genuineness." Id. § 1604.1 (a) (2) (1970).
42. Id. § 1604.5 (b) (1970) (emphasis added).
43. This view is the one accepted by the CPC Guidelines. See note 40 supra.
These guidelines urge the placement office to review the placement records of the
employer for any pattern of discriminatory employment. In addition, these guide-
lines urge that the institution advise the employer that its facilities are not avail-
able for use in conjunction with discriminatory actions and that all practices of
that employer when recruiting on campus be carefully reviewed.
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and CPC do apply to those firms who send what are called "inquiry
letters," indicating that they would like students to contact them
regarding jobs, but that for various reasons the firm has not elected
to interview on campus.4 Handling of such inquiries by the place-
ment office constitutes a referral.
4. Bona Fide Occupational Qualification
One additional problem faced by the placement office arises
when an employer who is discriminating asserts a BFOQ. Although
this problem will probably be rare for law school placement offices,45
when and if it does occur the institution must know if it has a
statutory duty to determine whether the employer's claim is legiti-
mate. Regulation 1604.5 (b), probably based on the difficulties a
placement office would encounter in a BFOQ investigation, states
that there is no duty to investigate the claim "[i]f the agency does not
have reason to believe"'04 that the claim is without substance. Rather,
the regulation requires only that the agency make and maintain a
written record of each such job order available to the commission.
Such record must include the name of the employer, a description of
the job, and the basis of the claim of a BFOQ. This absence of a duty
to investigate depends on the ability of the placement office to accept
the employer's assertion in good faith. Such good faith requires that
the placement office have no grounds to suspect that the assertion
44. See notes 37, 38 & accompanying text supra.
45. The BFOQ problem confronted Duke Law School last year when FBI agents
visited the placement office and requested recruiting notices be posted. Portions of
that notice enumerated the qualifications required of prospective applicants, the
first one being "they must be male citizens of the United States." The notice con-
cluded with the statement that "The Federal Bureau of Investigation is an equal
opportunity employer." Complaints of women students, who were not applicants
for an FBI position, concerning the posting of the notice were filed with the faculty
under the Law School's placement policy which had been adopted earlier in that
year. The faculty, however, dismissed the complaints for lack of standing, determining
that under the Law School's policy the adjudicative procedures could only be invoked
by a person who was able to show concrete injury and no bona fide applicant for a
job was involved. Complaints to EEOC after the dismissal under the School's own
procedure were not filed since Title VII, § 701 (b) does not include the United States
in the definition of an employer. The validity of a BFOQ for the FBI is now being
challenged elsewhere in the courts. See Nemser v. Hoover, Civil No. 1569-71 (D.D.C.
filed Aug. 18, 1971). Such a situation is probably one of the few examples where
attorneys are recruited and the employer asserts a BFOQ to eliminate women
applicants.
46. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.5 (b) (1970).
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(when read in conjunction with EEOC Regulation 1604.1 which
defines the circumstances where an asserted BFOQ is or is not
valid) is an illegally made assertion of a BFOQ. In addition, this
good faith determination must be an informed judgment, for a
further regulation requires that the employment facility keep in-
formed of opinions and decisions of EEOC on sex discrimination.47
III. LAw SCHOOL CONCERTED ACTION
In addition to the legal duties imposed by Title VII and related
statutes, considerable attention has been devoted recently by law
school groups to the problem of sex discrimination in law school
placement. Twenty eastern schools48  (the consortium schools)
have for years subscribed to a list of "Interviewing Procedures for
Law Students and Prospective Employers" which is issued annually
under the sponsorship of the Recruitment of Young Lawyers Com-
mittee of the Association of the City Bar of New York. These
Interviewing Procedures have in reality established present norms in
law school placement activities.4 9 In October 1969, after several
incidents of discrimination against women had occurred in law
school placement offices, correspondence was initiated among the
consortium schools concerning the possibility of adopting a uniform
approach to the problem of sex discrimination by law firms. In
May 1970, the consortium schools added a new paragraph to the
Interviewing Procedures which remains the most positive action yet
taken by any law school group to require nondiscriminatory treat-
ment of all law school students participating in law school place-
ment activities. While the statement refers to "race, color, religious
47. Id. 16G4.5 (c).
48. Boston University School of Law, Brooklyn Law School, Columbia University
School of Law, Cornell Law School, Duke University School of Law, Fordham Uni-
versity School of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, George Washington
University Law School, Harvard University Law School, Howard University School
of Law, University of Michigan Law School, New York University School of Law,
Northwestern University School of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School,
Rutgers (The State (N.J.) University School of Law), St. John's University School of
Law, Syracuse University College of Law, Vanderbilt University School of Law, Uni-
versity of Virginia School of Law, Washington & Lee University School of Law, Yale
Law School. Northwestern University School of Law recently subscribed to the
procedures, thus increasing the consortium to 21 schools.
49. For an example of the kind of matters covered the 1971-72 issue requires
employers to hold open offers of employment to senior law students until at least
December 15 of the fall interviewing season.
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creed, or national origin"--in addition to sex-it was adopted as a
direct result of concern over incidents of sex discrimination. It
reads:
8. Each signatory law school is committed to a policy
against discrimination based on sex, race, color, religious
creed, or national origin. It is expected that employers will
conform to this policy, expressed in law by Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, and take positive steps to assure
that no such discrimination occurs in hiring, promotion,
compensation or work assignment. Any complaints will be
investigated [or referred to a proper agency for investigation],
as the placement facilities of each signatory school are avail-
able only to employers whose practices are consistent with
this policy. °
Paragraph eight of the Interviewing Procedures subscribed to by the
consortium schools is the only statement from any law school group
that implies that sanctions will be employed against offending firms.
The consortium schools specifically promise investigation of com-
plaints and indicate that the placement facilities of signatory
schools5l are available only to firms whose practices are nondis-
criminatory.
In late fall, 1969, when lively correspondence on sex discrimi-
nation in law school placement offices was circulating among the
consortium schools, Professor F. Hodge O'Neal of Duke University
Law School, then a member of the AALS Executive Committee,
suggested that the AALS Executive Committee should sponsor a
floor resolution dealing with the subject at its December 1969 annual
meeting. As a result of Professor O'Neal's activity, the AALS
without dissenting vote, formally recognized the problem of sex
discrimination by adopting the following resolutions:
1. The Association urges that members of the legal profes-
sion provide equal employment opportunities to female ap-
plicants for legal positions.
2. The Association urges that member schools take steps
50. Recruitment of Young Lawyers Committee of the Association of the City Bar
of New York, Interviewing Procedures for Law Students and Prospective Employers,
f 8 (1971).
51. Only Fordham, of the 20 signatory schools did not subscribe to the sanction
sentences of paragraph eight, set forth above in text. Id. (at signatories).
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within their power to eradicate sex based discrimination
within law schools and particularly in the placement process.52
Shortly thereafter, a Special AALS Committee on Women in
Legal Education was formed with Professor Daniel G. Collins of
New York University Law School as its first Chairman. 53 That com-
mittee immediately associated student members,54 collected valuable
statistical information,55 and drafted proposed amendments to both
the Articles and the Approved Policy of the AALS.
At the December 1970 annual meeting of the AALS, with one
exception, all of the Special Committee's proposed amendments
were adopted. 6 That one exception was the refusal of the Associa-
52. ASSOCIATION OF AMERCAN LAW SCHOOLS: 1969 PROCEEDINGs pt. 2, at 142 (1970).
53. Professor Ruth B. Ginsburg of Rutgers (N.J.) Law School is now Chair-
woman of the Committee.
54. It is apparently the first and still the only AALS Committee with student
members.
55. See note 4 & accompanying text supra.
56. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAw ScHooLs: 1970 PROCEEDINGS pt. 2, at 160-62, n.
2 (1971). Following is a complete text of the amendments. The text of paragraph 3 of
section 6-1 of article 6 and the Approved Association Policy thereunder, as amended
. . . reads as follows:
3. Equality of opportunity in legal education without discrimination or
segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex.
APPROVED ASSOCIATION POLICY
(a) Denials of Admission on the Ground of Race, Color, Religion, National
Origin, or Sex. If the Executive Committee finds that a member school has
denied admission to an applicant whom the school would have regarded as
qualified for admission but for race, color, religion, national origin, or sex,
the Committee shall recommend to the next annual meeting that the school
be censured; provided, that the Committee may temporarily defer such action
if it finds that there is a substantial prospect that within a reasonable time,
the school will adopt an admissions policy consistent with the Association's
requirement of equal opportunity for legal education without regard to race,
color, religion, national origin, or sex.
The denial by a member school of admission to a qualified applicant shall
be treated as made upon the ground of race, color, religion, national origin,
or sex if the ground of denial relied upon is:
i. A state constitutional provision or statute that purports to forbid the
admission of applicants to a school on the ground of race, color, re-
ligion, national origin, or sex; or
ii. An admissions qualification of the member school which the Executive
Committee finds to have been intended to prevent the admission of
applicants on the ground of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex
though not purporting to do so.
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tion to adopt a requirement that each member law school impose
sanctions when sex discrimination occurs in its placement office.
Sanctions were not adopted, despite the Association's adoption of a
policy statement condemning placement discrimination.Y Never-
(b) Denial of Law School Employment on the Ground of Race, Color, Religion,
National Origin, or Sex. If the Executive Committee finds that a member school
has denied employment on the ground of race, color, religion, national origin,
or sex, the Committee shall recommend to the next annual meeting that the
school be censured; provided, that the Committee may temporarily defer such
action if it finds that there is a substantial prospect that within a reasonable
time, the school will adopt an employment policy consistent with the Associa-
tion's requirement of equal opportunity in legal education without regard to
race, color, religion, national origin, or sex.
The denial by a member school of employment to a qualified individual
shall be treated as made upon the ground of race, color, religion, national
origin, or sex if the ground of denial relied upon is an employment policy of
the member school which the Executive Committee finds to have been in-
tended to prevent the employment of individuals on the ground of race, color,
religion, national origin, or sex though not purporting to do so.
(c) Placement. Equality of opportunity in legal education includes equal op-
portunity to obtain employment. Each member school should communicate
to every employer to whom it furnishes assistance and facilities for inter-
viewing and other placement functions the school's firm expectation that the
employer will observe the principle of equal opportunity, and to that end,
will avoid objectionable practices such as:
i. Refusing to hire or promote members of the groups protected by this
policy because of the prejudices of clients or of professional or official
associates;
ii. Applying standards in the hiring and promoting of such individuals
that are higher than those applied otherwise;
iii. Maintaining a starting or promotional salary scale as to such individuals
that is lower than is applied otherwise;
iv. Disregarding personal capabilities by assigning, in a predetermined
or mechanical manner, such individuals to certain kinds of work or
departments.
57. Extensive debate from the floor occurred over the committee's inclusion of
sanctions in its proposed amendment to the Association policy dealing with placement.
Those opposed to the use of sanctions felt, among other things that it: (1) would
be improper for the law school world to "coerce" people outside of the law school
community; (2) would involve law schools in supervising law firm policies; and (3)
would require all law schools to file charges and conduct hearings on complaints.
See AssocIATION oF AMfERICAN LAw Scuoors: 1970 PRocM lrNGs pt. 2, at 129, 147, 148,
151, 156, 157, 158 (1971) for remarks of Professors Murphy, Oaks, Merrill, and Gell-
horn. Upon motion by Professor Walter Gellhorn of Columbia, the committee proposal
was amended and the Association adopted the amended motion which is now the
Association Policy on Placement. Id. at 160-62. This amended motion, according to
Professor Gellhorn, leaves the decision of whether or not to hold hearings on com-
plaints to each law school without Association advice. Id. at 158.
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theless, the placement policy that was adopted still strongly affirms
the moral goal of no sex discrimination in placement.58
IV. ENFORCEMENT PROBLEMS
The legal obligations imposed under Title VII and the moral
obligations imposed by concerted law school action both require that
the private law school placement office take some appropriate cor-
rective action upon receipt of a complaint of sex discrimination. 9
But what action should a law school take when an incident of
alleged sex discrimination occurs through the use of its placement
facilities? As a minimum, some form of enforcement machinery or
policy should be established to give validity to nondiscrimination
policies.
Three questions immediately arise with the problem of enforce-
ment of equal opportunity standards in the conduct of placement
activities: (1) What obligation, if any, does a law school owe inter-
viewing firms to notify them of its nondiscrimination policies? (2)
What procedures should a law school employ when one of its stu-
dents alleges that a firm has violated its nondiscrimination policy?
and (3) What sanctions for noncompliance are available to a law
school, other than simply barring a firm from its facilities? Focusing
on these three questions will reveal the problems that a law school
will face as it attempts to formulate an effective means of enforcing
its nondiscrimination obligations.
A. Notice
A law school might reason that it owes no obligation of notice
to any firm using its placement facilities. The Civil Rights Act was
passed in 1964 and law firms can be assumed to know of its existence.
Nevertheless, minimal notice is affirmatively required by Title VIIP0
and law schools should be anxious to educate firms about their non-
discrimination policies. By an effective notice program, going be-
yond the bare requirements of Title VII, law schools can continu-
58. See note 56 & accompanying text supra.
59. The statistical data accumulated by the AALS Special Committee on Women
in Legal Education shows that, by mid-1970, only 37 percent of the law schools
answering the survey had written policies prohibiting sex discrimination by firms
or other employers. Over 50 percent of the schools with written policies against
sex discrimination had had incidents of alleged discrimination reported to them. See
notes 2 & 3 supra.
60. See note 33 & accompanying text supra.
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ously bring their policy of nondiscrimination to the attention of
law firms. If a law school has to punish a firm for noncompliance,
and perhaps bar it from using the school's facilities, it has perhaps
forever lost the excluded firm as a prospective employer. It would
be better to encourage the firm to reassess its attitudes and pledge
compliance. Hopefully, a broad notice system will help make law
school nondiscrimination policy positive rather than punitive, and
will help both schools and firms avoid discriminatory conduct.
Following are some rather obvious "notice" possibilities:
(1) Place a copy of the school's nondiscrimination policy in the
placement folder of every firm that visits the law school; the
consortium statement on nondiscrimination is an ideal statement
to include in all placement folders.
(2) Print the school's nondiscrimination statement on its place-
ment office stationery; thereafter each firm that receives a letter
from the placement office is reminded of the policy.
(8) Prepare a short article on the policy, its adoption and mean-
ing and include the article as an item of news in the next alumni
mailing.
(4) Inform all students of the policy and its meaning. A law
school's policy will need general student body support if any en-
forcement system established is to work.
B. Procedures
A more difficult problem than notice is the adoption of machin-
ery to adjudicate discrimination claims. Assume that Blackstone
Law School has adopted a nondiscrimination policy;," the firm of
Webster & Darrow comes to visit and Ms. Mary Jones, a female
law student, signs up for an interview. After the interview, Ms.
Jones tells the Placement Director that partner Horatio Webster,
who interviewed her, has indicated he will not hire her because she
is a "girl," that his firm has never hired a female associate before;
that the other partners would never agree to hire her; and that
moreover the firm's clients would not deal with a female attorney.
What does Blackstone Law School do? Neither the AALS amend-
ments nor Title VII tells the school what actual steps it should take.
Each law school is apparently free to adopt its own adjudication
procedures or to refer the complaint to an appropriate agency. It
61. It might be appropriate to observe that by reason of Title VII and AAIS
activities all law schools now have such a policy regardless of whether or not the
school has formally adopted a nondiscrimination statement.
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seems clear that the law school is not free to simply ignore the com-
plaint without itself risking legal liability under Title VII. Black-
stone Law School must formulate and effectuate adequate proce-
dures for dealing with Ms. Jones' complaint.
To be effective any procedure adopted must meet two tests: (1)
it must be fair to both parties-to the law firm and the student
complainant alike; and (2) it must be speedy. The placement sea-
son covers two months in the fall at most schools and then, for all
practical purposes, is concluded as a formal activity. Any procedure
to determine the truth of a sex discrimination charge should be re-
solved as rapidly as possible or the results of any sanction -will be
deferred at best to the next placement season a year away. Further-
more, charges of discrimination can be disruptive to student tran-
quility and should be handled with dispatch. The procedure adopted
must give a fair opportunity for each party to tell his or her side,
establish some sort of tribunal that is able to make factual deter-
minations impartially, and confine the operation of the entire pro-
cedure to a reasonably short time period. Superficially, it might
seem that law schools, of all our institutions, should be best equipped
to develop such procedures. On the contrary, it is more likely that
most of our law schools, because of their institutional makeup,
will be hard pressed to devise a procedure which meets the tests
of fairness and of speed. At most law schools, all policy decisions are
referred, at least ostensibly, to the full faculty for discussion if not
decision. If a determination which could result in the ultimate
barring of a firm from the use of school facilities is considered a
policy decision, then it would, under present conditions in most
schools, go to the full faculty for resolution. A faculty meeting,
which might be ideal for debate and resolution of competing policy
considerations, is certainly a less than ideal fact-finding tribunal.
On the other hand, if the faculty merely adopts a policy of nondis-
crimination and mandates the enforcement of that policy to the
placement dean or some other administrative body, extremely im-
portant factual decisions are without the control of the faculty.
Would not most faculties consider it important to retain some
power over the decision-making process-at least by way of some
sort of appellate review, if nothing else? Arguably yes, and conse-
quently, if Blackstone Law School's first discrimination complaint
occurs prior to adoption of a procedure to resolve factual disputes,
that school probably faces a very difficult problem. Suppose that
Dean Wigmore of Blackstone Law School receives the complaint on
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Webster & Darrow and must decide how to proceed. Assume he is
cautious and asks the faculty for advice. Such consultations take
time: the firm has left the premises; the faculty has to be called
together; some members may suggest that they resolve the dispute
on the complaint only; others say the firm ought to be heard.
Assume Dean Wigmore is then mandated to obtain the firm's side
of the story. He writes Webster & Darrow who respond and deny
everything, alleging that Ms. Jones was belligerent, refused to give
her grades, and insisted on talking only about Women's Liberation.
What then? What further facts are needed or available? Basically
the question is whether to believe Ms. Jones or the firm. Who re-
solves that question? The Dean? The faculty by majority vote?
These questions are difficult enough with settled, regularized proce-
dures; they can be traumatic, if Blackstone Law School has to formu-
late procedures in the context of an existing controversy. Therefore,
it is recommended that at a minimum, the following steps should be
taken: (1) An appropriate student-faculty committee should be
established well in advance of the next placement season to study
in detail the formulation of procedures that are both fair and
speedy;02 (2) any procedure adopted should have faculty approval,
in order that those charged with the enforcement process can pro-
ceed without concern about reversals or lack of support by higher
authority.
Any procedure adopted should contain the following minimal
safeguards:
1. Complaints: A designated official should receive all com-
plaints, and all complaints should be filed as soon as possible. There
appears to be no reason why a complaint cannot be filed within 24
hours after the occurrence of the alleged violation.
2. Probable Cause: There should be some person or body set
up to make a preliminary assessment of the probable validity of
the complaint. This evaluation might consist of a careful oral ex-
amination of the complainant to screen frivolous charges.
3. Notification to Firm: This should be done immediately
after probable cause is determined and, as a minimum, the firm
should be notified of the charges against them and the name of the
complainant. The firm then could be invited to appear or make a
62. It seems imperative that students be involved in formulation of these pro-
cedures because their stake in the placement process is more immediate and vital
than that of the faculty.
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statement within a reasonable time after receiving notice of the
charge.
4. Findings: The finder of fact should consider the complaint,
the supporting documents, and the response of the firm and then
submit findings. If the complaint is well-founded, either the finder
of fact or another body such as the faculty should impose sanctions.
While the above suggestions appear simple, in the institutional
framework of law school governance they can be most difficult to
accomplish. Nevertheless, procedures should be decided before
Blackstone Law School gets its first case. A copy of a very simple,
yet perhaps sufficient procedure for adjudicating sex discriminating
complaints that is now in effect at Duke Law School is included as
Appendix A.
C. Sanctions
The kinds of sanctions available to an individual school range
from reprimand, through compliance pledge, to suspension, to an
absolute bar against future interviewing, to notification to other
schools, and to financial support of litigation.
Rather than discussing such obvious sanctions, it might be
profitable to broach the much more difficult subject of multi-school
sanctions. Many women students have argued that even the absolute
barring of a firm from one school can do little to prevent that
firm's continued use of discriminatory practices. Webster & Darrow
can write off Blackstone Law School and seek its legal talent from
other schools where it has a clean slate. These students urge that
the only effective sanction would be publication of every violation
at every law school followed by a "full faith and credit" policy in
all sister schools. For example, if Webster & Darrow were barred at
Blackstone School after a decision following regularized procedures,
it would then be Blackstone Law School's duty to inform other law
schools that the firm had violated Blackstone's nondiscrimination
policy and had been barred as a result. The other schools at which
Webster & Darrow were to interview would thereafter also be re-
quired to close their facilities to that firm.6 3 While this kind of multi-
school sanction can be called "full faith and credit," many law
firms would undoubtedly call it a blacklist.64
63. A similar type of "full faith and credit" would apply if a firm had been
reprimanded; a sister school would be entitled to require a pledge of compliance.
64. In an article dealing with black law students and their difficulties with
radal discrimination in the law school placement process, Professor E. Gellhorn sug-
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Although persuasive arguments can be made for the use of a
blacklist among law schools as the most effective sanction (there can
be little doubt as to the effectiveness of a well-administered black-
list), there are also powerful countervailing questions that can be
raised about such a list and the practical problems of obtaining the
approval of law schools to employment of such a sanction. Is em-
ployment of such a list inherently unfair? Is it a case of serious
overkill? Are there antitrust-type problems that could occur? What
body would set up such a list and see that it was fairly and effectively
administered? Once a firm was on the list, how could it remove
itself?
In 1970, C. Delos Putz, then Assistant Dean for Placement at
New York University, proposed to the AALS Special Committee
for Women in Legal Education a program calling for AALS enforce-
ment of nondiscrimination guidelines. He basically suggested the
formulation by the AALS of regional hearing panels to try all
discrimination complaints. He argued that such a procedure would
remove from AALS member schools the problem of enforcement
and the decision of an AALS panel might have greater weight with
other AALS schools than the decision of a single school following
its own internal procedure. Dean Putz's proposal deserves study as
it perhaps avoids some of the distastefulness of a blacklist; it is
included as Appendix B.
V. CONCLUSION
Every law school must face its obligation to enforce a policy of
nondiscrimination in placement because of race, color, creed, na-
tional origin or sex. A school can base its obligation on the Civil
Rights Act, morality, AALS policy, or all three-but however it is
viewed, the obligation is there. Therefore, each school should be
prepared to handle a charge of discrimination when it is lodged. It
would be wise for all law schools to consider immediately such prob-
lems as notice, procedures, and sanctions and adopt an effective
mechanism to handle sex discrimination complaints.
APPENDIX A
The facilities of the Duke Law School Placement Service are
gested that law schools should consider the possibility of multi-school sanctions for the
problem. Gellhorn, The Law Schools and the Negro, 1968 DuKE L.J. 1070, 1094-95.
65. Now Dean of the University of San Francisco School of Law.
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not available to prospective employers who discriminate against
Duke Law students on the basis of race, religion, sex or national
origin. A written complaint that a prospective employer has vio-
lated this policy may be filed with the Placement Dean by any
Duke student who claims that he has been discriminated against
by this prospective employer, the complaint to be filed as soon as
possible. The Dean of Placement shall then immediately endeavor
to gather together at least as many as three members of the Place-
ment Committee, one of whom must be a faculty member, in order
to make a preliminary assessment of the validity of the complaint
and, if further investigation is required in order to make this pre-
liminary assessment, to appoint a member of the Placement Com-
mittee to conduct this further investigation. Upon a preliminary
determination that a complaint is probably valid, the Dean of
Placement shall advise the firm or interviewer involved of the nature
of the complaint against them and the name of the person making
the complaint; and he shall inform the firm or interviewer that
the faculty would be pleased to consider any statement on the matter
that they might wish to submit within some reasonable time. It
would be anticipated that in most cases fifteen days would be an
appropriate time limit. After completing its investigation and after
considering any statement that a firm might care to submit to the
faculty, the Placement Committee shall determine the relevant
facts and, if it finds that a violation has occurred, prepare an ap-
propriate report to the faculty, which shall consider the report as
soon as possible.
If the Placement Committee determines that a violation of the
Law School's policy has occurred, the faculty shall, if it decides that
the violation is substantial or likely to occur again, either issue a
warning to the firm or, in more serious cases, inform the firm or
interviewer that the placement facilities of the Law School shall no
longer be available to them.
APPENDIx B
To: Professor Daniel Collins, Chairman
AALS Committee on Women in Legal Education
From: Delos Putz, Assistant Dean
Re: Proposal for Adjudication of Complaints Concerning Dis-
crimination by Employers
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I understand that your Committee is preparing to recommend
that the AALS adopt a strong anti-discrimination statement on place-
ment facilities based on the policy adopted by NYU last Fall. If the
policy is to be effective, it must be accompanied by enforcement
procedures. There ought to be some tribunal before which dis-
crimination complaints can be "tried," and the tribunal should be
such that its decisions can be given "full faith and credit" by law
schools generally. It seems evident that state Human Rights Com-
missions and the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission
are not adequate tribunals for enforcement of anti-discrimination
policies adopted by law schools and their placement offices.
I would propose that the AALS, in conjunction with adoption
of a strong anti-discrimination policy, undertake to assist in the
enforcement of that policy by establishing procedures for the ap-
pointment of panels of "hearing examiners" in various regions
throughout the country before whom discrimination complaints
could be "tried." The proposal should spell out the categories of
persons to be represented on the panels, e.g., a law professor from
the area, a representative of the local bar association, a non-lawyer
from business or government, and a specific requirement for women
on the panel in sex discrimination cases, etc. Student complaints of
discrimination are ordinarily brought initially to law school place-
ment offices. If, after preliminary investigation, it appeared that
there was at least a prima facie case, the placement office could refer
the complaint to the appropriate organ of the AALS and request
that a panel be convened to investigate the charge.
Although employers could only be invited to participate in such
a hearing, it seems likely that most employers would do so. The
refusal of an employer to participate would not prevent the panel
from holding a hearing and making findings.
If the panel determined that the employer had violated the
anti-discrimination policy promulgated by the AALS, it could im-
pose appropriate sanctions, ranging from an admonition to pro-
hibiting the employer from using the placement facilities of AALS
members for a stated period of time or filing of a complaint by the
AALS against the employer with appropriate governmental au-
thorities, such as the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission.
I think this proposal offers a number of advantages. First, it
would be something of an empty gesture to adopt an anti-discrim-
ination policy without providing some meaningful enforcement
procedures. Second, placing the judicial function in a broadly based
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panel appointed by the AALS takes some of the enforcement burden
off the individual law schools and reduces the probability that any
particular school might be boycotted by potential employers (a fear
which I have heard expressed by a number of placement officers).
Third, the proposal reduces, although it does not eliminate the
problem of the faith and credit that the various law schools can
give to findings of employer discrimination. Most law schools would
be extremely reluctant to bar an employer from using their place-
ment facilities simply because unknown people at another law
school, using unknown procedures, had concluded that the employer
was guilty of discrimination at that school. A decision by an AALS
appointed panel, independent of the school at which the alleged dis-
crimination occurred, would probably be accepted and enforced by
most member schools. Lastly, the proposal permits the school to
retain a high degree of "prosecutorial discretion" in determining
what complaints to refer to the AALS for hearing.
There are, of course, significant political problems to be over-
come in obtaining AALS approval of the proposed statement of
policy, even without enforcement procedures of the type proposed
here. If your Committee finds some merit in recommending enforce-
ment procedures, it would seem appropriate to seek the cooperation
and support of the AALS Committee on Minority Groups, currently
chaired by Dean McKay.
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